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This paper describes the main trends of Brazil’s fiscal policy during the last decade, and
analyzes empirically three key aspects:  1) the ability to raise the primary surplus in response to
external shocks: 2) the procyclical nature of fiscal policy; and 3) the long run impact of
government expenditure composition and taxation.  The use of the primary balance as a policy
tool is analyzed within the Drudi-Prati (2001) model, according to which, the government uses
the primary balance as a signaling tool to reveal its commitment to serve its debt.  As the debt
increases, the dependable government will use more actively its primary balance.  We verify that
both the debt ratio and the primary balance are determinants of spreads (ratings) in Brazil.
However, the relationship is non-linear, as the impact of the primary balance on spreads is
amplified as the debt ratio increases.
The relationship between the primary balance and economic activity is analyzed by
means of the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach (Pesaran and Shin, 1999).
Results indicate a positive correlation of the primary balance and output in the long run, but
negative in the short run.  Fiscal expansions are associated with primary balance reduction and
vice-versa during output contractions, verifying the pro-cyclical nature of fiscal balances.
The impact of public expenditure composition and taxation on growth is analyzed in a
modified production function framework, in which private and public capital are inputs, jointly
with different types of public expenditure. The tax level is included to incorporate the
government’s budget constraint and to capture its potential negative effect on output.  The paper
uses two complementary approaches:  a single equation method (the ARDL) and a multiple
equation method (the cointegratng VAR) useful to analyze the interaction between the variables.
Similar results are obtained: large elasticities of output with respect to capital stocks, a
significant negative impact of taxation on long-run GDP, and a negative impact on GDP of
increasing government consumption and transfer payments.  These results shed light on the role
of fiscal policy contribution to a disappointing growth performance in Brazil during the past
decade.
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I.  Introduction
Throughout the 1990s, Brazil started a process of economic reform including
liberalizing trade, relaxing price controls, and privatizing public enterprises.  Although
some problems remained at first, such as higher public sector deficits and limited
exchange rate flexibility, the country corrected most of these and steered a course toward
stability by the end of the millennium. In fact, since 1999, Brazil has made substantial
efforts to adjust its fiscal accounts. The country has moved in the direction of credible
rules that govern the outcome of the budget process and procedures that contribute to
providing incentives and constraints to promote fiscal discipline and increase
transparency. The hallmarks of these measures include the Fiscal Responsibility Law and
the impressive primary surplus targets achieved between 1999 and 2005.
Despite the impressive results some vulnerabilities still remains. In particular, the
quality of the fiscal adjustment brings doubts about growth prospects and the own
continuity of the hard fiscal stance. The fiscal adjustment has been accomplished through
strong revenue increases (the tax burden has grown from 29 percent of GDP in 1998 to
35 percent in 2004) and by curtailing public investment (investments by federal
government fell from 1.1 percent of GDP in 1998 to 0.5 percent in 2005).  The increase
of the tax burden and the compression of public investment are harming growth prospects
which can make more difficult debt dynamics in the future On the other hand, the
permanent increase of current expenditures and the impossibility to maintain the tax
burden growth are negatively affecting the sustainability of the current fiscal adjustment
effort. To sustain growth while re-orienting public finance towards investment therefore
represents the next chapter of Brazil’s national economic reforms.
The paper is organized in four sections following this introduction. The first
describes the main fiscal trends since the nineties, focusing mostly on the period 1999-
2005. The second section focuses on a mechanism that would allow fiscal policy to be
more responsive to shocks, by permitting automatic stabilizers to operate throughout the
business cycle to mitigate the pro-cyclicality of Brazilian fiscal accounts. This section
computes the long run effects of different variables on the primary balance and estimates
the cyclical component of the primary surplus. The third section examines the long-term
impact of public finance on growth, using a modified production function approach,  in
which private and public capital are considered inputs, jointly with different types of
public expenditure. Results indicate large elasticities of output with respect to capital
stocks, negative impact of public consumption and transfers in the long run, and a
significant negative impact of taxation on long-run GDP. The fourth section summarizes
the results and concludes.
I.  Background: Brazilian Fiscal Policy during 1990-2005
This section is divided into four parts. The first one describes fiscal outcomes
during the last fifteen years, focusing on the fiscal adjustment of 1999-2005. The second
section highlights the flexibility of fiscal policy during this volatile period, and examines
the role of the primary surplus as a signaling device in a world of imperfect information.
The third section assesses the quality of the fiscal adjustment identifying the type of
adjustment carried out-revenue increasing or expenditure cutting. The fourth section
attributes the type of fiscal adjustment to the high budget rigidity.2
A.  Fiscal Policy Trends in Brazil
During the last years of the military regime, the Brazilian public sector showed
signs of financial fragility.  Slower growth combined with the external shocks, led to a
fall in public sector savings.  The re-democratization process deepened the fiscal
disequilibria, because the new democratic government set out to satisfy repressed social
demands for redistribution. The 1988 Constitution expanded the social responsibilities of
the state, guaranteed free access to social services, established higher social security
benefits, and defined a generous regime for public sector employees (Bevilaqua and
Werneck, 1998).  The new Constitution also modified the federal fiscal system, creating
an imbalance between resources and responsibilities among levels of government.
Finally, the 1988 Constitution increased the rigidity of public spending through the
earmarking of an important part of fiscal revenues.
These measures had a very perverse effect on public finances, but inflation
postponed the collapse of the fiscal regime.  During this high-inflation period, the
asymmetric indexation to inflation of revenues and expenditures, higher for revenues than
for expenditures, produced artificially positive balances (Cardoso, 1998).  Additionally,
the negative real interest rates and the inflation tax generated soft budget constraints and
positive fiscal outcomes.
The evolution of fiscal accounts during 1990-2005 can be divided into three sub-
periods, as shown in Figure 1.  The first one, 1990-1994, registers positive primary
outcomes and operational equilibriums. In the second one, from 1995 to 1998, the
primary surplus vanishes, while the last sub-period, 1999-2003, corresponds to the fiscal
adjustment years and shows a permanent improvement of the primary surplus from –
0.2% of GDP in 1998, to 4.7% in 2005.
Figure 1 





























































Primary Balance Total Balance Annual Inflation
Collor Plan
(March, 1990)
Real Plan - Cardoso I
(July, 1994)
Inflation Targeting Regime - 
Cardoso II (May, 1999)
President Lula 
Administration.
The end of the inflationary process in the mid nineties coincided with
deteriorating fiscal outcomes in 1995-98. Inflation was not only a revenue source, but
was also a useful mechanism to control government spending in real terms during the
high inflation era (Cardoso, 1998). This loss of flexibility, combined with a lack of
decisive fiscal reform, produced rising public sector deficits. The excess spending
relative to national income was financed in liquid international capital markets, with
public debt rising from 29% of GDP in 1994 to almost 42% in 1998.3
The central bank sterilized these capital inflows through open market operations
to avoid monetary expansion and maintain a pegged exchange rate.  This response
complicated the situation even more because it entailed rising central bank (domestic)
debt and climbing interest rates that raised the cost of servicing public debt.  High interest
rates combined with the pegged exchange rate attracted even more capital, worsening the
state of affairs.  The higher debt and the rigid fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate
policies, left the economy vulnerable and with no capacity to absorb shocks.  When the
Asian and Russian financial crises occurred in 1997-1998, Brazil was severely affected
due to its sizeable external financing requirements. In January 1999, the central bank
abandoned its crawling peg exchange rate regime in favor of a flexible rate and adopted
an inflation-targeting framework for managing monetary policy.
In 1999, the country tackled its fiscal imbalance by launching the Fiscal Stability
Program, which consisted not only in raising taxes, but also in designing a legal
framework for fiscal policy management.  The government set and met stringent targets
for the primary fiscal surplus; the public sector primary surplus increased permanently
from 3.3 percent of GDP in 1999 to 4.7 percent of GDP in 2005.
However, the high interest rates and the exchange rate devaluations of 1999, 2001
and 2002 prevented a more accentuated reduction of operational deficits. Consequently,
the primary surpluses were not sufficient to truncate the rising path of public debt. Table
1 compares the three periods. During 1995-98, the operational balance deteriorated by
almost 5% of GDP in comparison with the period 1990-94. This was a result of a rise of
1.5% of GDP in interest payments and a fall of the primary surplus of 3.5% of GDP. The
Federal government was responsible for 60% of fall in the operational balance, and for
more than 40% in the decrease of the primary surplus. States and local governments and
public enterprises were responsible for 30% each for the worsening of the results.
Table 1: Fiscal Balances*, 1990-2005
  Annual Averages (% of GDP)
  1990-1994 1995-1998 1999-2002 2003-2005
  (A) (B) (C) (D)
     
I  Operational Balance (III - II) -0.05 -5.01 -1.52 -1.40
        Federal Government 0.52 -2.48 -1.55 -1.93
        States and Municipalities -0.25 -1.98 -0.37 -0.22
        Public Enterprises -0.31 -0.55 0.41 0.70
    
    
II  Real Interest Payments 3.33 4.84 5.09 5.96
        Federal Government 1.26 2.78 3.67 4.71
        States and Municipalities 0.86 1.64 0.98 1.21
        Public Enterprises 1.20 0.42 0.07 0.08
    
    
III  Primary Balance 3.27 -0.17 3.58 4.56
        Federal Government 1.78 0.30 2.11 2.78
        States and Municipalities 0.61 -0.34 0.61 0.99
        Public Enterprises 0.89 -0.13 0.85 0.79
       
* ( + ) Surplus ( - ) Deficit4
B. The Flexible Primary Surplus as a Device to Signal Fiscal Sustainability
How do governments that are not fully credible signal regime sustainability?
Based on the Drudi-Prati (2000)2 model that rationalizes debt accumulation and delayed
stabilization, we analyze the Brazilian case.  The main testable implication of the Drudi-
Prati (DP) model is the existence of a positive relationship between the spreads and the
debt level and a negative association between spreads and primary balances. This
relationship is conditioned on the debt level: Given uncertainty about the likelihood of
default, the government will use the primary balance as a signaling tool to reveal to
investors its true type.  As the debt level rises, the dependable government (though not
fully credible) will use more actively its primary balance as a signaling tool.
Spreads on sovereign debt are crucial determinants of the nominal exchange rate
in Brazil and on domestic interest rates.  What is the relation between these rates and the
fiscal variables?  For Brazil, primary balances and spreads show a non-stable association
(Figure 2).  From 1994 to 1998, when fiscal balances deteriorated, spreads declined.
After 1999, when fiscal balances improved, spreads declined further.  Drudi and Prati
verified this non-monotonic relationship in their study of several European countries. The
relationship between public debt and spreads is also non-monotonic.  From 1994 –1997,
when the debt ratio was low and slightly rising, spreads fell.  Since 1999, however,
Brazilian spreads and debt ratios appear to have settled at a higher level (Figure 3).
Drudi and Prati (DP) described a similar phenomenon for the European countries.
The DP model predicts that the primary fiscal balances and public debt ratios
enter the rating (spreads) function, and that the primary balance has a more influential
role when debt ratios are high.  This section verifies econometrically the following three
testable implications of the DP model: 1) Debt ratios and primary balances are
complementary in the spreads function; 2) The signaling role of the primary balance
                                                
2 Drudi, F. and A. Prati (2000), “Signaling fiscal regime sustainability,” European Economic Review, Vol.
44 pp. 1897-1930.
Figure 2
Primary Fiscal Balances and Sovereign Spreads in Brazil
1994-2003
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increases with the debt ratio; and, 3) If the government is dependable, then the primary
balance will rise when the debt ratio increases.
To verify the complementary role of fiscal balances and debt ratios in the spreads
function, we regressed the sovereign spreads on the first two variables (lagged).  Table 3
shows that both variables enter significantly in the spreads function with the expected
signs.
Table 3
Complementary Roles of Debt Ratios and Primary Balances as Spreads' Determinants
Dependent Variable: EMBORLAT
Method: Least Squares
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.26 0.06 -4.45 0.00
DEBTY(-1) 0.01 0.00 4.48 0.00
PRIMBAL(-1) -0.02 0.01 -2.40 0.02
R-squared 0.454     Mean dependent var -0.011
Adjusted R-squared 0.441     S.D. dependent var 0.083
S.E. of regression 0.062     Akaike info criterion -2.698
Sum squared resid 0.309     Schwarz criterion -2.611
Log likelihood 116.295     F-statistic 33.723
Durbin-Watson stat 0.362     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
EMBORLAT= Brazil EMBI spreads orthogonalized from Latin EMBI average
DEBTY= Debt to GDP ratio
PRIMBAL= Primary fiscal balance
The second implication of the DP model, namely the changing nature of the
signaling role of primary balances, is captured by the inclusion of an auxiliary which
reflects the interaction of the primary balances with the debt ratio.  If this variable is
significant, then the hypothesis of the difference in the signaling role cannot be rejected.
Results in table 4 shows that the primary balance coefficient rose with the debt ratio,
implying that signaling takes time and is not a once-and-for-all event.
  Table 4
The changing role of primary balances- Test 2
Dependent Variable: EMBORLAT
Method: Least Squares
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.530713 0.071481 -7.424499 0.0000
DEBTY(-1) 0.014446 0.001826 7.912960 0.0000
PRIMBAL(-1) -0.024688 0.003926 -6.288602 0.0000
PRIMBAL(-1)*(DEBTDEV) -0.002630 0.000572 -4.593340 0.0000
R-squared 0.632718     Mean dependent var -0.011316
Adjusted R-squared 0.618945     S.D. dependent var 0.082535
S.E. of regression 0.050949     Akaike info criterion -3.069552
Sum squared resid 0.207661     Schwarz criterion -2.953799
Log likelihood 132.9212     F-statistic 45.93872
Durbin-Watson stat 0.632039     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
DEBTDEV=Deviation of the debt ratio from the sample mean
The third and final implication of the DP model, the positive association between
the primary balance and the debt ratio if the government is dependable is reflected in
Table 5.6
Table 5
Primary Balances and Debt Ratios
Dependent Variable: PRIMBAL
Method: Least Squares
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -2.921112 1.048574 -2.785795 0.0066
DEBTY(-1) 0.112549 0.022527 4.996247 0.0000
R-squared 0.247189     Mean dependent var 1.631294
Adjusted R-squared 0.238119     S.D. dependent var 2.060787
S.E. of regression 1.798774     Akaike info criterion 4.035336
Sum squared resid 268.5538     Schwarz criterion 4.092810
Log likelihood -169.5018     F-statistic 27.25346
Durbin-Watson stat 0.049271     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001
C. The Type of Brazilian Fiscal Adjustment, 1999-2005
During the first four years of the Real Plan (1995-98), fiscal accounts were
imbalanced due mostly to the loss of inflation as an adjustment mechanism and to the
lack of decisive fiscal reform.  As Table 6 shows, the weaker fiscal stance of the 1995-98
is explained by rising expenditure, which grew by 16%, with personnel and social
security benefits expanding the most.  Revenue rose just 8% or 1.4% of GDP, with
growth concentrated on taxes, while the revenues of the Social Security System remained
stable. In sum, the fiscal expansion of 1995-98 was caused by rising expenditure and not
to revenue reduction.
The adjustment of the federal fiscal accounts in the last six years has been based
on revenue increases and investment cuts.  During 1999-2005, tax revenue rose by 4.6 %
of GDP. Spending also grew, but at a slower rate: it rose by 2.5 percentage points of GDP
during 1999-2005 As in the 1995-98, current expenditure accounted for the bulk of the
rise, while capital spending were reduced. In this case, personnel expenditures remained
stable while social security benefits and intergovernmental transfers experienced more
dramatic increases.
The revenue-increasing nature of the 1999-2003 fiscal adjustment raises concerns
about its sustainability.   International experience shows that revenue-based adjustments
tend to be short-lived (Alesina and Peroti, 1996). As spending follows the rising revenue,
the adjustment effort is weakened and the lasting effect is a larger government.7
D.  The rigidity of expenditures as the main explanation of the type of adjustment
Fiscal adjustment was revenue-based because of the rigidity of public spending.
At the federal level, this rigidity is caused by three factors: i) the rise of  social security
and social assistance benefits; ii) the job tenure stability rules for public servants made
impossible reducing the public sector payroll;  and,  iii) the constitutional earmarking of
an important part of federal tax revenues.
The 1988 Constitution reinforced the three factors of expenditure rigidity through
the concession of higher social security benefits and softening the eligibility criteria,
defining a generous regime for official public employees which included job tenure and
higher compensations and pension benefits equal to 100% of exit salaries, extending
these benefits to all public sector employees and strengthening the intergovernmental
transfers system. The 1988 Constitution favored the expansion of  social responsibilities
of the state, guaranteeing free access to social services, particularly health services,
creating the unemployment insurance, establishing minimum social security benefits (1
minimum wage), and universalizing it by extending coverage to rural workers.  Figure 4
shows the rising share of mandatory spending between 1986 and 2003.  The increasing
rigidity is due to the rise of personnel, social security and assistance transfers, and the
intergovernmental transfers to states and municipalities that increased from 55% of non-
financial expenditure in 1986 to almost 80% in 2001.
Categories
1990-1994 1995-1998 1999-2005 (B) - (A) Decomp I Decomp II (C) - (B) Decomp I Decomp II
(A) (B) (C)
I Total Revenue 17.3 18.6 23.2 1.3 7.7 102 100 4.6 24.6 222 100
      Treasury Revenue 11.9 13.6 18.0 1.7 14.6 132 130 4.3 31.8 210 95
           Tax Revenue 11.0 12.0 16.6 1.1 9.9 83 81 4.5 37.6 219 99
           Other Treasury Revenues 1.2 1.6 1.4 0.4 32.1 29 29 -0.2 -12.0 -9 -4
      Social Security Revenue 5.0 5.1 5.3 0.1 2.7 10 10 0.2 3.3 84
II Total Expenditure 15.8 18.4 20.8 2.6 16.4 -198 100 2.5 13.5 -120 100
      Personnel and Social Contributions 4.4 5.2 5.1 0.7 17.0 -57 29 -0.1 -1.3 3 -3
      Social Security Benefits 4.2 5.4 6.7 1.2 30.0 -95 48 1.3 23.4 -61 51
      Other Current and Capital Expenditures 4.3 4.8 5.2 0.5 11.1 -36 18 0.4 8.3 -19 16
           Subsidies 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 98.2 -8 4 0.1 51.3 -5 4
           FAT 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.3 138.7 -25 12 0.0 2.4 -1 1
           Other- Goods and Services and Investment 4.0 4.0 4.3 0.0 1.1 -3 2 0.3 6.8 -13 11
      Intergovernmental Transfers 2.9 3.0 3.9 0.1 3.9 -9 4 0.9 29.4 -43 36





Table 6: Federal Government Primary Surplus Changes, 1990 - 2005
Annual Averages (% of GDP) Variation 91/94 - 95/98 Variation 95/98 - 99/058
As a result of the growing share of mandatory spending, investment and other
current expenditures decreased their share from around 51% of non-financial
expenditures to less than 20% in 2001. Clearly, social security transfers are the fastest-
increasing type of expenditure, generating a huge deficit that has to be covered by the
Treasury. Figure 5 shows the evolution of the social security system imbalances during
the period 1990-2005. While in 1990 the deficit was 1.4% of GDP, in 2005 it reached
5.7%.
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III. Procyclical Fiscal Policy in Brazil
 
Figure 4















































The vicious circle of procyclical fiscal policy, volatility and limited
creditworthiness has been amply documented for Latin America (Gavin, Hausmann,
Perotti and Talvi, 1996).  Pro-cyclical fiscal policy is explained by the following factors:
a) limited access to international credit markets during a shock implies that countries are
unable to follow a tax-smoothing approach and have to tighten fiscal policy; b) tax
structures that are heavily dependant on cyclical-sensitive income, such as indirect taxes
(Gavin and Perotti, 1997); and c) weak institutional structures that do not allow
generation of large enough primary surpluses in good times and lead to increased
spending during expansionary phases (Talvi and Vegh, 2000).  Several authors have
attempted to documented the procyclical nature of Brazil’s fiscal policy ( IMF, WEO,
2002) but results are not very robust.
To examine the relationship between the primary balance and economic activity
in the short and in the long run, we adopted the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL)
approach (Pesaran and Shin, 1999, and Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 1999) because it is
robust to the order of integration and cointegration of the regressors, hence the pre-testing
procedures may be avoided.  This approach also has the advantage that the lags in each of
the regressors are allowed to be different, and the endogeneity problem can be eliminated
by appropriate selection of the lag length (Pesaran and Shin, 1999).
This section follows closely Pesaran & Pesaran (1997) and Pesaran and Shin
(1999), summarizing briefly the main points, and referring the interested reader to the
original sources.
Consider the simplest autoregressive distributed lag ARDL (p, q1, q2,,...,qk)
model,
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where  p ˆ  and  i q ˆ  , i=1,2,...,k are the selected values of p and q
                                                
3 The model is first estimated by OLS method for all possible values of p=0,1,2,...,m, qi=0,,1,2,...,m,
i=1,2,...,k. A total of (m+1)
k+1. .models are estimated. The maximum lag length might be chosen using
alternative criteria: The R
2 criterion, the Akaike information criterion, Schwarz criterion, or Hannan-Quinn.10
Rewriting equation 1 in terms of lagged values and the first differences of yt and
xit derives the error correction model of the estimated ARDL.
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The asymptotic variance of the long-run estimators obtained by OLS estimation
of (1) can be computed by means of the delta-method, which involves complicated
computational procedures (Pesaran & Pesaran, 1997).  Fortunately, a statistical package
(Microfit) provides this option for single equation estimation.  Alternatively, a variant of
the error-correction form can be estimated by instrumental variables.
Given this number of variables (6), and that the maximum lag was chosen to be 3,
a total of (3+1)
6+1= 16,384  ARDL regressions were run. Hence we ran the primary
balance as the dependent variable with the following regressors: public debt, spreads,
output, real exchange rate, and real interest rates.  The model selection process was based
on four different criteria:  Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the R-Bar Squared
(RBSC), Schwarz Bayesian (SBC) criterion, and Hannan-Quinn(HQ).  Tables 7 and 8
summarize both the long-run coefficients and the short-run dynamics of the primary
balance.
Table 7
Estimated Long-Run Coefficients for the Primary Balance
1991:01 – 2002:01
AIC RBSC SBC HQC








































Standard error in (). *Significant at the .01 level; ** Significant at the .05 level; *** Significant at the  .10
level
Table 7 shows that, in the long run, output is positively correlated with the
primary balance.  However, Table 8 shows that, in the short run, the correlation is
negative, implying that fiscal expansions are associated with primary balance reductions,
and the primary balance increases during output contractions, verifying the pro-cyclical
nature of fiscal balances. Another interesting result depicted in Table 7 is the positive and
significant relationship between the primary balance and the public debt ratio.  This fact
may be interpreted as the result of a fiscally responsible sovereign that adjusts its primary
to compensate changes in the debt ratio.
Finally, in this section we estimate the cyclical component of the primary balance
by regressing this variable on the long-run components of each of the explanatory
variables used in the previous exercise.  The residual of such regression is the part of the11
primary balance explained by the transitory or cyclical components of each of the
explanatory variables.  Hence, we interpret this residual as the cyclical component of the
primary balance (Figure 6).  In general, we observe that this component fluctuates
between plus or minus 1 percent of GDP, with the most recent levels close to lower
bound. That is, at the end of 2003, the economic slowdown and other transitory
fluctuations of variables affecting the primary balance had a negative impact of close to
one percent of GDP, compared to the positive impact of more than one percent of GDP in
early 2000.  Given that the observed primary balance improved by .5 percent of GDP
during the period, the structural balance improved by close to 1.5 percent of GDP.
Table 8
Error-correction Representation for the Selected ARDL models 1991-2002
Dependent variable: d Primary Balance
AIC RBSC SBC HQC
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2 .30 .30 .21 .23
D.W. 2.15 2.06 2.09 2.05
*   Significant at the .01 level
** Significant at the .05 level
*** Significant at the  .10 level
Figure 6: Cyclical Component of the Primary Balance
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IV. Public Expenditure Composition and Growth
In this section we estimate the long run and short run impact of government
expenditure on Brazilian growth using two related methods.  First, we use the single-
equation ARDL methodology described in the previous section, and then we use a
multiple-equation co-integrating VAR approach to examine the relationship among the
several variables.
Using data for 1950-2000, the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) estimates a
long run relationship and an error correction representation between income per capita,
private and public capital stocks per capita and three components of government current
expenditure (subsidies, social security and assistance transfers and consumption)
4. The
estimation also included tax revenues and public debt as a share of GDP to control for the
government’s budget identity and the potential negative effects of the government
financing on economic activity. The data for the stocks of private and public capital was
obtained from Reis et al (2002) and the flow data, that is income per capita and
government current expenditures come from the National Accounts System - IBGE.
Tables 9 and 10 report the long-run coefficients and short-run dynamics estimated
with this method.
5    Table 12 shows that, in the long run the elasticity of output with
respect to the public capital stock is larger than in that of the private sector.  The
estimated elasticity seems high when it is compared with estimated values for the US or
OECD economies (Sturn  and de Haan, 1995; Hurlin, 2001), but similar to existing
Brazilian estimates for infrastructure (Cavalcanti, 2004)  However, the negative impact of
the tax ratio is surprisingly large: an increase of 1 percentage point in the tax ratio lowers
GDP per capita by 1 percent.
                                                
4 It also has the advantage that the lags in each of the regressors are allowed to be different, and the
endogeneity problem can be eliminated by appropriate selection of the lag length (Pesaran and Shin, 1999)
5 The tables report results for the different models: Akaika (AIC), Schwarz (SBC), R-Bar Squared (RBSQ)
and Hanaan-Quinn (HQ).  The production function was estimated in per capita terms, dividing all the
arguments by the economically active population.  There are 8 variables: GDP per capita, private capital
stock per capita, public capital stock per capita, government subsidies, government consumption,
government social security transfers, tax revenue ratio to GDP, and the public debt ratio to GDP.  The
maximum lag was 3.  this produced a total of  262,144 possible combinations.  THE AIC, SBC and HQC
selected an ARDL (1,2,0,1,0,0,0,3) while the RBSC selected a (1,2,1,1,0,1,0,3)model.13
Table 9
Estimated Long-Run Coefficients for the GDP per capita
1950 – 2002
AIC RBSC SBC HQC
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Standard errors in (). *Significant at the .01 level.** Significant at the .05 level. *** Significant at the  .10
level
Government expenditures in consumption or social security have no effect on per-
capita GDP, while subsidies have a negative impact.  The positive effect of public debt
ratio is somewhat puzzling and could be reflecting an endogeneity problem i.e. that as
GDP per capita increases there is a larger demand for financial assets and public bonds is
one of those assets that domestic agents demand.  To examine this hypothesis, we used
Granger causality tests and the Wu-Hausman exogeneity test and both lead to the non-
rejection of the exogenous public debt hypothesis.
In the short run ( Table 5 ) private capital has a greater impact on GDP per capita
than the public capital.  Government expenditures have no effect on GDP, and tax rates
have a negative impact on GDP. Public debt has also negative impact on GDP per capita
in the short-run.
The long run results are puzzling for two reasons.  First, because the high public
capital elasticity and, second, because the fact that the public sector elasticity is higher
than the private one.  This fact is also present in several of the classic studies for the US
and OECD economies, such as Aschauer(1989), Ram and Ramsey (1989), Eisner (1994),
Sturn and de Haan (1995), Balmaseda (1997) and Viverberg (1997).  Hurlin (2001a,
2001b) shows that, in general, papers based on time series analysis of variables in levels,
like the present one, tend to find large output elasticities of public capital.  Hurlin shows
that there are two potential sources of bias for this finding: one the endogeneity of the
factors of production, i.e. the fact that the productivity of private capital may depend on
the level of public capital; and b) the fact that in most of those studies the output and the
inputs are not cointegrated and the variables are non-stationary leading to the spurious
regression problem.
The first source of bias may not be a serious problem in this specific case, given the
ARDL methodology produces consistent estimates of the long run coefficients (Pesaran
an Shin, 1997).  We tested for the correlation between both private and public capital and
the residual of the regression, and were unable to reject the exogeneity of these variables.14
The second source of potential bias may be a problem, because based on the ARDL
approach and the proposed method to test for long run relationships (Pesaran, Shin and
Smith, 1999) the computed F-statistic between the upper and lower bounds that do not
allow firm rejection or non-rejection of the null hypothesis of no long run relationship.
Table 10
Error-correction Representation for the Selected ARDL models 1952-2002
Dependent variable: d GDP per capita
AIC RBSC SBC HQC













































































































2 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.88
D.W. 1.99 1.92 1.99 1.99
*   Significant at the .01 level. ** Significant at the .05 level. *** Significant at the  .10 level
To examine further this potential problem, we adopted a multiple equation
cointegrating VAR approach.  This approach will also allow examination of relationships
between variables that the single-equation ARDL approach did not allow.  With the same
set of variables, we were unable to reject the hypothesis of up to four cointegrating
vectors.  To reduce the dimensionality of the problem (and based on the variance
decomposition) we excluded the debt variable and were able to reduce the number of
cointegrating vectors to two.
6
With the specified system of six variables we examined the response of per capita
GDP to multiple shocks with the Generalized Impulse Response Function.  A one
standard deviation shock to public capital (1.7 percent of GDP) that at the end of the
                                                
6 See Appendix for the cointegration tests. One of the vectors, however, showed no persistence in the
deviations from the equilibrium relationship to system-wide shocks.  The other vector, on the opposite,
showed temporary deviations from the equilibrium relationship returning after a few years.  We arbitrarily
eliminated the first one and remained with a single cointegrating vector.15
simulation period (10 years) implies a higher public capital stock by almost 7 percent  is
associated with a 5 percent higher GDP (Figure 7); this fact implies a long run elasticity
of about  .7, almost identical to the long run elasticity estimated by the single-equation
(ARDL) method.  This approach, however, has the advantage of allowing examination of
the impact of this shock on other variables. For instance, such a shock to public capital is
also associated with an increase in private capital of almost 5 percent by the end of the
forecasting horizon (Fig.8) verifying some degree of complementarity between both
types of capital.
A shock to private capital stock, representing a rise of six percent (in the long run) is
associated with a higher GDP by 4 percent (Fig. 9).  This would imply a long run
elasticity of about .6, much higher than the one estimated by the ARDL.
Figure 7
 Generalized Impulse Response(s) to one S.E. shock in the equation for
LKSTPUBP
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Another interesting result refers to the impact of a tax shock.  A permanent
increase of the tax ratio (of 1.5 percent of GDP) is associated with a lower GDP per
capita of close to 1 percent (Figure 10), similar to the ARDL result. The same shock is
associated with a lower private capital stock (Figure 11)
Figure 10
 Generalized Impulse Response(s) to one S.E. shock in the equation for
TOTTAXGD
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A shock that leads to a permanent rise of government consumption expenditure
(of 7 percent in real terms) is associated with a fall in per capita GDP (Figure 12). This
shock is associated with a higher tax ratio (Figure 13), lower private capital stock (Fig
14) and lower public capital stock as well (Figure 15).
Figure 1217
 Generalized Impulse Response(s) to one S.E. shock in the equation for
LGOVCONP
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The other two types of government expenditures, namely the subsidies and social
security transfers have negligible effects on GDP in the medium term and opposing
effects in the long run. Given the small size of this type of expenditure, we will focus
here on the effect of social security transfers. Social security transfers have a negative
growth effect (Figure 16), primarily because of the associated reduction in the public
sector capital (Figure 17). A 5 percent increase in the social security payments is
associated with a fall of 3 percent in the public capital stock.
Figure 16
 Generalized Impulse Response(s) to one S.E. shock in the equation for
LGOVSSTP
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V.  Conclusions and Policy Implications
During the past decade, the successful episodes of Brazilian stabilization coincide
with those when fiscal policy was flexible to change the primary surpluses, while crises
emerge when there is little flexibility to adjust to external shocks.  For instance, the 1998-
1999 episodes show the importance of the primary balance as a signaling tool in a world
of imperfect information. In contrast to the 1998-1999 stabilization, fiscal policy was
unresponsive to shocks in 2002, causing concerns of fiscal policy sustainability.
Compounded by electoral uncertainty, the situation ended in the 2002 debt crisis
Brazilian fiscal adjustment has been of mixed quality. On one hand, most of the
adjustment has been revenue-based and cutting capital expenditures. In the early nineties,
the tax burden was 25% of GDP while in 2005 it reached 37%.  In addition to the high
level of taxation, the increasing share of indirect cumulative taxes and the over-taxation
of a reduced tax base, generated distortions in economic decisions. On the other hand, the
expenditure composition shows the rising trend in pension payments and the inequality
that the pension regime originated in favor of the public servants.
Our findings show that Brazilian fiscal policy is procyclical in the short run:
output expansions are associated with smaller primary balances, while output
contractions with higher ones.  In the long run, however, the evidence shows that fiscal
policy is countercyclical, that is a 1% increase in output is associated with a higher
primary balance of 0.2% of GDP.
The analyses presented in this chapter support the contention that Brazil may
benefit from increased public spending in the area of economic infrastructure.  The
econometric analysis using historical data from Brazil indicate positive and strong growth
effects of public physical capital stock and public investments. The analysis points out
clearly the negative effects of increasing taxation on economic growth.  Thus, it is not
advisable for Brazil to pursue its need for increasing public investments via expansionary
fiscal policy that results in a higher tax burden than the current level.  Instead, a long-run
solution to recovering an adequate level of public investments must be sought in
reallocation of public spending within the fixed overall fiscal envelope.  This means the
need to re-examine the composition of the current expenditures, including those allocated
to the social sectors that today consume a lion’s share of Brazil’s public expenditures.
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